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IS HEALTH INSURANCE A BAD IDEA?
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN PERSPECTIVE
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost1
Unique among the developed nations of the world, the United States
depends on private insurance to insure a majority of its residents.2 Private
insurance exists virtually everywhere in the world, but in most countries it
merely supplements or complements a comprehensive public insurance
program that covers all, or virtually all, of the population.3 There are
complicated historical, political, and cultural reasons why we depend on
private insurance for health coverage in the United States.4 It seems very
unlikely, however, that we will abandon private health insurance as our
primary form of health coverage in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, it seems clear, that private insurance coverage in the
United States is on the decline. Employment-based insurance coverage
probably peaked sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and has been
falling ever since, with a brief uptick in the late 1990s. Coverage has
dropped from 73 percent of the population under 65 in 1999 to 66.5 percent
in 2006.5 Even though public insurance coverage has been growing as
private insurance coverage shrinks, the number of uninsured continues to
rise, to 43.6 to 44.8 million, nearly 17% of the under-65 population in
2005-2006.6
1. Robert F. Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University., This article
was submitted in August of 2007, and was current as of that date. It is based in part on my
recently published book: TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 54-69 (2007). I would like to thank the Frances Lewis
Law Center and the Willett Family for research support.
2. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do? National Health
Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 433 (2004) (describing how other nations
provide health care coverage).
3. ELIAS MOSSIALOS & SARAH M.S. THOMPSON, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, FUNDING HEALTH CARE: OPTIONS FOR EUROPE 128-31 (Elias
Mossialos et al. eds., 2002)
4. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1.
5. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS UNDER
AGE 65 YEARS WITH PUBLIC HEALTH PLAN COVERAGE AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE
BY
AGE
GROUP:
UNITED
STATES,
1997-2006
(2007),
COVERAGE,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200706_01.pdf.
6. The lower figure is from: CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AT THE TIME
BY
AGE
GROUP:
UNITED
STATES,
1997-2006
(2007),
OF
INTERVIEW,
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Although most view the number of uninsured as a problem, a small, but
very influential minority of American policy advocates consider
“overinsurance” to be our most serious policy problem.7 The strength of
this movement, known euphemistically as the consumer-driven health
care (CDHC) movement, is demonstrated by the fact that these advocates
succeeded in the waning moments of the 109th Congress, in expanding
federal tax subsidies for health savings accounts (HSAs), their policy
alternative to conventional health insurance.8
Since the early 1970s, a number of conservative and libertarian
advocacy groups have kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism of our current
private health insurance system.9 They claim that this system is the product
of bad public policy, in particular of the employment-related health
insurance tax subsidy.10 This subsidy, they charge, has resulted in
employers offering and employees accepting far more insurance than
would be purchased without the tax subsidy.11
This excessive insurance, they claim, results in excess consumption
and higher prices of health care. The tax subsidy decreases the price to
consumers and thus increases the demand for health insurance, which in
turn decreases the price to consumers and increases the demand for health

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200706_01.pdf. The higher figure is from:
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Revises 2004 and 2005 Health
Insurance Coverage Estimates (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/health_care_insurance/009789.html.
7. See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION:
WHAT’S HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 46-58 (2005); JOHN C.
GOODMAN, GERALD L. MUSGRAVE & DEVON M. HERRICK, LIVES AT RISK: SINGLE-PAYER
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2004); JOST, supra note 1, at 35.
8. Health Savings Accounts were created by the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066
(2003), and codified at I.R.C. § 223 (2007). Contribution limits were liberalized by the
Health Opportunity Patient Empowerment Act of 2006 in the last minutes of the 109th
Congress; see Press Release, United States Treasury, President Bush Signs Bill to Make
Health Care More Affordable, Accessible (Dec. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp209.htm.
9. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 70-85.
10. See JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY,
WEALTHY, AND WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 15-16, 27-33 (2005);
CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 61-66; JOHN C. GOODMAN, GERLAD L. MUSGRAVE &
DEVON M. HERRICK, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS, 50-51
(1992).
11. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 62-65.
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care.12 Insured health care consumers buy far more health care products
and services than they would if they had to pay for health care out of their
own pockets. This is the phenomenon of moral hazard that insurance
teachers talk about every day. Consumers also pay higher prices than they
would pay without insurance because they have no incentive to shop
around for lower price providers.13 The tax subsidy is, therefore, one of the
most important reasons why health care costs so much in the United
States14 While the moral hazard claims of CDHC advocates seem to be
solidly based in neoclassical economic theory, they also are supported by
the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, which found that insureds with
higher deductible plans do in fact consume less health care.15
But there is more to their claims. CDHC advocates also argue that
consumers who are not paying for health care out of their own pockets are
less concerned about quality than they might be if they were paying for
services themselves.16 At least, consumers have less reason to seek out
comparative information regarding providers, which could support
shopping based on quality as well as cost.17 Fully insured individuals also
have less incentive to take care of themselves, to engage in healthy
behaviors and seek preventive or early primary care, and thus are more
likely to become ill and need health care18 (a claim, by the way, that the
Rand study found no evidence to support).19
The ultimate solution to the problem of excess insurance–simply
outlawing health insurance–is not embraced by even the most fervent
market advocates. They understand the problem of catastrophic costs – of
the highly skewed nature of health care costs that accounts for health
insurance in the first place.20 Few people can afford to pay out of pocket
for a heart transplant or for the services required to respond to the major

12. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 62-63; COGAN, HUBBARD & KESSLER, supra
note 10, at 29-30.
13. JOST, supra note 1, at 19.
14. See supra note 10.
15. See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993); see JOST, supra note 1, at 120-28 (examining the findings
of and critiquing the RAND HIE).
16. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 54-57.
17. Id.
18. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 92-94.
19. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15 at 200-01, 208.
20. See Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?, supra note 2, at 436.
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traumatic injuries caused by a car accident.21 Many of those afflicted with
expensive chronic diseases would soon find themselves unable to afford
further health care without health insurance. Bankruptcy solves the
problems of some of those faced with enormous expenses and no
insurance, but it only deals with already incurred costs and does not assure
continuing access to care.22 Bankruptcy, moreover, only shifts the costs of
care to providers, who themselves may be financially unable to absorb the
loss.
Acknowledging the problems that would attend the elimination of
health insurance, CDHC advocates rather call for limiting insurance to truly
catastrophic expenses through the imposition of high deductibles.23 Most,
but not all, CDHC advocates also call for the creation of health savings
accounts (HSAs) to be coupled with high-deductible health insurance plans
(HDHPs).24 They call for tax subsidies to cover contributions to the HSAs
(whether contributions come from employers or employees) as well as the
income from those plans and payments for high-deductible health plans.25
Advocates contend that HSAs will introduce point-of-purchase competition
into health care and save the cost of claims processing, thus reducing health
care costs.26 At the same time, they believe that HSAs will assure that
consumers have funds available to purchase health care, thus assuring
access, and will encourage consumers to shop for better quality products
and services, thus improving quality. They even argue that moving to
CDHC will expand insurance coverage, as catastrophic policies will be
more affordable, both because they offer thinner coverage and because
consumers will consume more cost consciously, bringing down insurance
costs.27
Over the past half decade the CDHC movement has been
extraordinarily successful in public policy advocacy. Although tax
subsidies for medical savings accounts were first introduced by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, they were subject to
21. According to recent estimates, heart transplants cost from $50,000 to $287,000,
averaging $148,000, while liver transplants cost from $66,000 to $367,000, averaging
$235,000. Transplant, CHFPATIENTS.COM, http://www.chfpatients.com/tx/transplant.htm.
22. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor Patient: In Search of Non-Debt Based
Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 456-57, 462 (2003-2004).
23. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 231-32.
24. Id., CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 66-68.
25. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 67; Cogan, Hubbard, & Kessler, supra note
10, at 35-38.
26. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 249-250.
27. Id. at 250.
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The Medicare
many restrictions and never really caught on.28
Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), however, greatly expanded tax
subsidies for health care accounts, which it rechristened health savings
accounts, or HSAs.29
The MMA offers a tax exclusion to employers and a deduction to
employees for funds contributed by an employer or employee to an HSA.
The HSA must, however, be coupled with a HDHP, which must, in 2007,
have a deductible of at least $1100 a year for a single individual or $2200 a
year for family coverage.30 The catastrophic policies that accompany an
HSA must also have caps on out of pocket expenditures, which cannot
exceed $5500 for an individual and $11,000 for a family in 2007.31 The tax
subsidies for contributions to the HSA for 2007 only extend to
contributions up to, for 2007, $2850 for individual coverage and $5650 for
family coverage.32 Under the MMA, tax-deductible contributions were also
limited to the amount of the deductible, but this limit was removed by
Congress in legislation late in 2006.33
Money contributed to an HSA can be spent for “qualified medical
expenses,” without being subject to income tax, but withdrawals are subject
to both income tax and to a 10% excise tax if it is spent for other
purposes.34 “Qualified medical expenses” are broadly defined to include
many things not covered by traditional health insurance, such as
nonprescription drugs. HSA expenditures are controlled only by very
28. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 301, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (1996). Too few people signed up for the HIPAA
demonstration project to allow program evaluation. General Accounting Office, Medical
Savings Accounts: Results form Surveys of Insurers, 1 (1998).
29. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 1201, and codified as amended at I.R.C. § 223.
For a careful
examination of these provisions, see Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal
Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36
MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 548-56 (2005).
30. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) & (II) (2000). See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml.
The insurer may, however, cover preventive medical expenses, such as screenings or
vaccinations, before the deductible is met. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(C), I.R.S. Notice 2004-23,
2004-15 I.R.B. 725.
31. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) & (II) (2000). See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml
32. I.R.C. § 223(b) (2000). See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml.
33. H.R. 6408, § 303, 110th Cong. (2007).
34. I.R.C. § 223(f) (2000).
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infrequent audits by IRS auditors who have no health care expertise35. It is
likely, therefore, that HSA expenditures will be limited only by the
imagination, on the one hand, and good faith, on the other, of their owners.
If HSA funds are not spent for health care, they can be withdrawn for
any purpose once the account holder dies, becomes disabled, or reaches the
age of 65.36 HSA funds may continue to be withdrawn after age 65 for
qualified medical expenses, including Medicare premiums, free from
taxation.37 If they are used for other purposes after age 65, withdrawals are
taxed as income, but no penalties attach.
The HSA has been joined by another new health savings device, the
health reimbursement account or HRA. The HRA was created not by a
statute but rather by the IRS. In 2002, the IRS determined that existing
legislation authorized the offer of tax subsidies for employer contributions
to health savings vehicles fully funded by employers.38 The HRA is
attractive to employers because the accounts can be held as notional
accounts and need not be fully funded and because the funds in them also
need not go with the employee if he or she leaves employment.
HSAs and HRAs have grown quite quickly over the past two years,
although the number enrolled in these plans, like everything else about
them, is contested. The Employee Benefits Research Institute estimates
that about 1.3 million Americans are enrolled in a consumer-driven plan,
though another 8.5 million Americans have a plan with a deductible high
enough that they could set up an HSA.39 The Center for Health Systems
change estimates that about 1.43 million Americans have an employmentbased HSA and 1.3 million have an HRA.40 AHIP, the health insurance
trade association, claims that 4.5 million Americans are in HSA-compatible

35. I.R.C. § 223(d)(2) (2000). Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-38 I.R.B. 559; I.R.S. Notice
2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269.
36. I.R.C. § 223(f)(4) (2000).
37. I.R.C. §§ 223(d)(2)(C)(iv), (f)(1) (2000).
38. Rev. Rul. 2002-41.
39. Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins, The 2nd Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund
Consumerism in Health Care Survey, Employee Benefit Research Center, Issue Brief No.
300, December, 2006.
40. Jon Gabel, Jeremy Pickreign, & Heidi Whitmore, Behind the Slow Growth of
Employer-Based Consumer-Directed Health Plans, Center for Studying Health System
Change,
Issue
Brief
No.
107,
December
2006,
available
at
http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/900/900.pdf.
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plans.41 CDHC advocates claim that the number of Americans in
consumer-driven plans will grow to 15-30 million over the next 5 to 10
years,42 but CDHC growth, rapid in the first two years, seems to have
leveled off, at least in the employment-related market.43
There has been a great deal of speculation as to how CDHC will affect
health care in general and the health insurance market in particular.44
Advocates believe, of course, that it will bring down costs while improving
quality and access. Skeptics have worried that CDHC will lead to favorable
selection, as healthy individuals and families choose consumer driven
plans, leaving those with costly medical problems in comprehensive plans,
which will become ever more costly as they cover a smaller and more

41. AHIP.org, January 2007 Census Shows 4.5 Million People Covered by
HSA/High-Deductible Health Plans, Ctr. for Policy and Research, April 2, 2007, available
at http://www.ahipresearch.org/PDFs/FINAL%20AHIP_HSAReport.pdf.
42. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Dramatic Growth of Health Savings
Accounts,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/pdf/fact-sheet-dramaticgrowth.pdf (14 million by 2010); Health Savings Account Enrollees Predicted to Rise to 30
WIRE,
May
10,
2007,
available
at
Million
by
2009,
BUSINESS
http://www.allbusiness.com/services/business-services/4342771-1.html.
43. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 6.
44. Much of this speculation is found in the large and growing law review literature
on consumer-driven health care and HSAs. For a sampling of the law review literature
examining the policy implications of consumer-driven health care, see generally Marshall
Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: Informed Consent
and Informed Choice, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1 (2007); W. Eugene Basanta,
Consumer-Driven Health Care: Legal and Policy Implications, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (2007);
Arnold J. Rosoff, Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Questions, Cautions, and an
Inconvenient Truth, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 11 (2007); Michele Melden, Guarding Against the
High Risk of High Deductible Health Plans: A Proposal for Regulatory Protections, 18
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 403 (2006); David Pratt, Healthy, Wealthy, and Dead: Health
Savings Accounts, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 7 (2006); Amy Monahan, The Promise and Peril
of Ownership Society Health Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006); John V. Jacobi,
Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 531 (2005);
and Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
485 (2004). See also, exploring more closely the implications of consumer-driven health
care for the legal relationships of patients and health care professionals and providers, Mark
A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106
MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008); Peter D. Jacobson and Michael R. Tunick, Consumer-Directed
Health Care and the Courts: Let The Buyer (And Seller) Beware, 26(3) HEALTH AFF.,
May/June 2007 at 704; Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay
For: Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159
(2006); and E. Haavi Morreim, High –Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old
Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (2006).
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expensive population, the familiar insurance death spiral.45. Skeptics also
wonder whether consumers have the information, or perhaps even the
ability, to make wise consumer choices in health care.46 The Rand HIE, for
example, found that although insureds with higher deductibles did consume
less health care, they cut back on high value health care to the same extent
they cut back on low value health care.47
Empirical evidence as to how CDHC is working out remains sketchy.
It seems to be working out very well for banks. HSAs are the kind of low
interest savings accounts that used to be the bread and butter of banks but
that have been hard to market in recent years because they are bad financial
investments. The HSA market is worth billions to banks, not just because
banks pay low interest on these deposits, but also because they collect fees
for establishing the accounts and for transactions.48 HSAs are also seem to
be working out quite well for insurance companies that specialize in these
accounts, several of which have bought or partnered with banks, and some
of which are managing the accounts themselves.49 Finally, HSAs are
working out very well for wealthy individuals looking for a retirement tax
shelter. Individuals in high tax brackets who have the choice of doing so
are well advised to buy a eligible high deductible policy, cover any medical
expenses from the deductible, and invest the legal maximum in the HSA,
leaving it there for retirement to accumulate tax-free returns. This strategy
could allow, by one scenario, a tax-free accumulation of $1.5 million by
retirement over a 40 year period.50
It is less clear how CDHC is working out for employers, who purchase
much of the private health insurance in the U.S., and for providers. High
deductible policies are obviously somewhat less expensive than
comprehensive policies, but if employers make a significant contribution to
their employees’ HSAs, they do not necessarily pay less overall.51 Some
45. JOST, supra note 1, at 133-134.
46. Id. at 137.
47. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 162.
48. James G. Knight, What HSAs Mean for Banks, AMERICAN BANKER, April 29,
2005,
available
at
http://americanbanker.com/article.html?id=20050428X7JY10TC&queryid=630711033&hit
num=2; Eric Dash, Health Savings Promise a Windfall for U.S. Banks, REDORBIT NEWS,
Jan. 29, 2006, available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/display/?id=373206.
49. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 23.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer
Health Benefits, 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, at 5 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/.
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providers welcome the possibility of being able to bill consumers directly
rather than to deal with insurers, but in fact most consumer-driven policies
are structured so that the provider bills the insurer in any event, and the
insurer then collects from the HSA.52 This assures consumers access to the
insurer’s bargaining power, but means that there is little savings in
transaction costs. To the extent that providers bill consumers directly, they
will experience savings in transactions costs and probably be able to charge
higher prices, but they also have more risk exposure if consumers are
unable to pay the bill.
The most important question, however, is how does consumer-driven
health care affect consumers? First, there is some evidence of favorable
selection toward consumer-driven plans, which seem to be chosen by those
in better health, but the effect is not clear.53 Because high deductible and
high coinsurance plans have become quite common in recent years, even
before the MMA, CDHC plans might be quite attractive to people with
high medical costs because the law at least requires a cap on out-of-pocket
limits. There is more evidence that CDHC plans are chosen by wealthier
and better educated subscribers, which is not surprising.54
There is also some evidence that CDHC reduces health care spending
and use, and that participants in CDHC plans use more preventive care
(which can under the law be excluded from deductibles) and comply better
with prescribed treatment regimes.55 Evidence on cost-savings, however, is
still weak and confounded by the possibility of favorable selection, while
evidence of quality improvement is far from conclusive. Some studies, for
example, find that CDHC members are more likely to delay or forego
needed medical care or the use of necessary medications.56
The most troubling emerging evidence is that CDHC is further eroding
the modest level of health care solidarity that private health insurance has
brought about in this country. The public health insurance systems of all
other developed countries are based, in the end, on the idea of solidarity–
the belief that we are all at risk of disease and injury, that we all need to be
52. Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in ConsumerDriven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 408 (2005).
53. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin, et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early
Evidence About Effects on Cost and Quality, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 516, 519, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?ck=nck&andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1
&disp_type=&author1=&fulltext=&pubdate_year=2006&volume=25&firstpage=516.
54. Id.; JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 139.
55. JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK,, supra note 1, at 145.
56. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 26, 29.
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healthy to be productive members of society, and we ought all to contribute
to the cost of health care to the extent of our ability to the cost of providing
health care for all.57 Employment-based health insurance has sustained a
weak version of solidarity in the United States. Within employment
settings, most employees have more or less equal access to health
insurance, subsidized by the taxpayer, and with costs arguably borne
somewhat disproportionately by higher income employees.58
If employers move toward high deductible policies, however, an ever
greater proportion of the cost of health care is going to be passed directly
on to employees, particularly sick employees. Recent research shows that
the majority of employees in high deductible plans are not offered a choice
by their employer; they are simply given the high-deductible plan.59
Thirty percent of employees with CDHC’s moreover, receive no employer
contribution to an HSA, and over half receive less than $1000 per year.60
Lower income employees, moreover, often contribute little or nothing
themselves to an HSA. 27% of individuals in CDHC plans with incomes
of less than $50,000 a year contribute nothing to their HSA according to
the EBRI survey.61 Of those who have had HSAs for a year or more, 23
percent rolled over nothing at the end of the year, 26%, $500 or less.62
Overall 14% had nothing in their accounts at the time of the survey, 16%
more $200 or less.63 44% of those who did not open an account said that
they did not do so because they did not have money to put into the account,
19% said that the tax benefits were not attractive enough to justify it.64
Of course, high deductible accounts mean high exposure for those with
high health care costs, and overwhelming evidence has emerged in recent
years that consumers with high deductible accounts who lack health
savings accounts forego necessary health care. Adults with health
problems who have deductibles above $500 (and particularly those with
incomes below $35,000 a year) are much more likely than those with lower
deductibles to not fill a prescription, not get needed specialist care, to skip a
57. Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do, supra note 2, at 433-34.
58. See Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy To Employment-Based Health Insurance and
the Distribution of Well-Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 89 (2006).
59. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 14. The same is true for about 2 in 5
employees in plans with HSAs/HRAs, Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and
Educational Trust, supra note 50 at 103.
60. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 51, at 105.
61. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 18.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 14.
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recommended test or follow-up visit, or report having a medical problem
for which they have not sought medical care.65 Patients with high
deductibles are also much more likely to have medical bill or medical debt
problems.66 Nearly half of “underinsured” adults identified by a recent
survey were contacted by a collection agency in the year prior to the survey
regarding medical bills, while more than one-third said that they had to
change their lives dramatically to pay for medical bills.67
To put it bluntly, whatever else CDHC may accomplish, it seems to be
bringing us tax subsidized retirement savings for the rich, high deductible
health plans and financial misery for the poor. If one believes that health
insurance is a bad idea, that health insurance must be seriously curtailed to
bring about consumer choice and efficient markets, this cost in solidarity
may be acceptable.
If one believes, however, that insurance is ultimately about solidarity,
not efficiency, these issues are troubling. Health insurance obviously
contributes to solidarity between the sick and the healthy, but can also build
solidarity between the poor and the wealthy. Health insurance is also about
security–knowing that when you need health care you will be able to get it,
and to get it without missing a rent payment or a car payment. Efficiency
is a good thing, of course, and the efficient distribution of health care
should be encouraged. But the evidence that CDHC is bringing us
efficiency is at best equivocal. The evidence that it is bringing about the
breakdown of solidarity and threatening security is stronger. Health
insurance is, in fact, a good idea, and we must look for ways to achieve
efficiency while preserving what little risk sharing still exists in this
country–perhaps even building on it. But how we can achieve this is
beyond the scope of this essay.68

65. See Karen Davis, Michelle M. Doty and Alice Ho, How High Is Too High?
Implications of High-Deductible Health Plans, Commonwealth Fund Pub. No. 816, 2005, at
9,
available
at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/816_Davis_how_high_is_too_high_impl_HD
HPs.pdf?section=4039.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Cathy Schoen, et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults are
AFFAIRS,
at
w5-296,
June
14,
2005,
Underinsured?
HEALTH
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.289.
68. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 189-204 (exploring this topic
further).
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